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and Stephen Clark were part of the Group that was
fonned in Oxford in the late 19608 and early 1970s, as
were three young Oxford philosophers: Roslind and
Stanley Godloviteh, and John Harris, who, in 1971, with
the publication of Animals, Men and Morals: AnInquiry
into the Maltreatment ofNon-humans (Gollancz), fired
what many regard as the frrst volley in "the modem
movement" for animal rights, a not altogether accurate
characterization given the earlier, pioneering work of
such figures as Helen Jones, for example.
Peter Singer, who knew the members of the Oxford
Group but was not himself a member while a student in
Oxford, fired the next volley when, in 1973, he
published his seminal review of Animals, Men and
Morals in the New York Review ofBooks. Here was a
case where a review proved to be even more important
than the important book that was reviewed. Singer's
briefagainst animal exploitation was clear, concise and
compelling, and reader response was overwhelmingly
favorable-so favorable, in fact, that the New York
Review ofBooks itself took the unusual step ofactually
publishing a book by Singer.
That book was Animal Liberation. The year was
1975, the same year Ryder published Victims ofScience:
The Use ofAnimals in Science (Davis-Poynter), "one
of the centIal books of the animal liberation movement,"
in Brigid Brophy's words. A year laterAndrew Linzey's
Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment of Man's

Among other notable accomplishments, Richard
Ryder is a survivor. Whereas others have come and
gone, or seen their star rise only to fall, Ryder has
demonstrated true British grit Today, after more than
twenty years of activism on behalf of nonhuman
animals, he is more not less committed, and his
influence is larger not smaller. While this former young
Turk, an original member of the Oxford Group, has
become part of the animal welfare establishment (Ryder
is past chairman ofthe Royal Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals [RSPCA] and currently serves
as its vice-chairman), he has not lost his fITe or his
vision. With the publication ofhis impressive historical
work, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards
Speciesism, Ryder has consolidated his position as one
of the world's most informed, articulate and politically
astute voices being raised against those speciesist
attitudes and practices that keep nonhuman animals
in bondage.
Ryder's own career understandably is part of the
history he tells. Though small in number, the members
of the Oxford Group played-and many of them
continue to play-a decisive role in the struggle for
animal rights. In addition to Ryder, Andrew Linzey
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Treatment ofAnimals (SCM Press) was published, and
a year after that saw Stephen Clark's The Moral Status
of Animals (Oxford). By 1977, then, the modem
movement was well launched, and the small band of
progressive anti-speciesists who comprised the Oxford
Group (Ryder had coined the term "speciesism" in 1970)
played a historically decisive role in launching it
Ryder's role has been more than theoretical. He has
been, and continues to be, a man of action, and it was
in no small measure because of his leadership that the
RSPCA has experienced what many regard as a
significant period of reform. Moreover, Ryder, along
with Andrew Linzey, oversaw the organization of the
historically important 1977 Cambridge Conference on
Animal Rights, so-called because it was held at Trinity
College, Cambridge University, the proceedings of
which were later published as Animals' Rights: A
Symposium (Centaur, 1979). Ryder drafted "A
Declaration Against Speciesism" that was signed by 150
of the attendees. The Declaration reads as follows:

Oxford, meat dishes, ranging from morning sausage
and bacon to cuts of pork and beef, were offered at
each of the meals. Only after enough of those in
attendance raised their collective voice in opposition
were veal and venison removed from the menu. The
moral conscience of the majority was salved when
chicken and salmon were substituted, while, like
proverbial untouchables, vegans were asked to sit en
masse at a table of their own.
The history of the modem movement, including the
important contributions by members of the Oxford
Group, is but one part of the large historical landscape
Ryder presents, a landscape that traces the attitudes of
humans to other animals from the cave paintings of
Lascaux and Altamira up to, and beyond, the activities
of the Animal Liberation Front In between there are
separate chapters on ''The Christian Legacy: Medieval
Attitudes" and ''The International Movement, 17001960," for example. Without wishing to disparage
Ryder's contributions to our understanding of these
different times and nations, it remains true that his book
is for the most part a history of British attitudes toward
nonhuman animals, and it is as a contribution to the
history of these attitudes that its real significance will
be measured.
The British portrait, as drawn by Ryder, is not a
pretty one. Even into the latter part of the eighteenth
century people made sport of eating live cats at country
fairs, and considerable ingenuity was shown in
arranging bloody, fatal contests between animals. These
and other blood sports, as well as bear, boar and bull
baiting, found favor among the "lower" classes and in
part helped form Continental perception of the British
as coarse and cruel. Indeed, Ryder himself is moved to
observe that "perhaps it was partly because Britain had
been the cruelest nation in Europe that it led the humane
reaction over the next two decades" (p. 64).
And lead they did, from the less well-known but
visionary theology of Humphrey Primatt, whose 1776

Inasmuch as we believe that there is ample
evidence that many other species are capable
of feeling, we condemn totally the infliction
of suffering upon our brother and sister
animals, and the curtailment of their enjoyment, unless it be necessary for their own
individual benefit.
We do not accept that a difference in species
alone (any more than a difference in race) can
justify wanton exploitation or oppression in
the name of science or sport, or for food,
commercial profit or other human gain.
We believe in the evolutionary and moral
kinship ofall animals and we declare our belief
that all sentient creatures have rights to life,
liberty and the quest for happiness.
We call for the protection of these rights.

book. The Duty ofMercy and the Sin ofCruelty to Brute
Animals, still deserves to be read, to the better-known

Of this declaration, Ryder notes that it was "youthful
and idealistic in tone" (p. 197). Of the conference itself,
he observes that it "was not only a novelty for the
RSPCA, it was the first serious conference ever held
anywhere, which was devoted entirely to animal rights,
and I hope, the last such occasion at which meat was
offered to those staying forlunch!" (p. 198). That hope,
like the declaration, has proven to be "youthful and_
idealistic." At a major international conference in 1990,
organized by the RSPCA and held at Christ College,

Spring 1991

poets of compassion---Pope, Goldsmith, Burns, Blake,
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron" and Shelley, for
example---and the philosophers Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, whose utilitarian enfranchisement of
all sentient animals into the moral community continues
to exercise its IX>wer and influence even today. The modern
movement, it seems safe to say, would not be what it is if
these creative pioneers had not paved the way.
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The history of the British struggleagainst speciesism
is more than the emergence of new voices in theology,
poetry, and philosophy. Part of this struggle has been
waged in the trenches ofparliament, and the story Ryder
tells will not gladden the hearts of partisans of animal
rights. Perhaps it is not surprising that the fust animal
protection bill introduced before parliament, which
would have prohibited bull baiting, was defeated (this
was in April of 18(0), or that other proposed legislation
also failed. Sadly, it was another twenty-two years
before the fust animal protection legislation, the famous
Martin Act, was passed. But it is more than surprising,
it is disconcerting to learn that the 1876 Cruelty to
Animals Act actually afforded more protection to
scientists using nonhuman animals in their research than
it provided the animals themselves, and that it was more
than another hundred years before that act was
amended, with few gains, in the eyes of many critics,
for the animals.
Still efforts were made, and like-minded people
began to join in common cause so as to exert their
collective power on behalfofanimal protection. Under
the leadership of Rev. Arthur Broome, the Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was launched on
June 16, 1824; when, in 1840, Queen Victoria gave her
blessing, this Society became the Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and earned, by the
fact of the queen's public endorsement of the cause of
animal protection, a degree of "fashionableness" it had
not been able to achieve on its own.
From the outset the RSPCA was conservative in
every sense of the word. It sought to disassociate itself
from "extremists," including Lewis Gompertz, author
of Moral Inquiries on the Situation ofMan and Brutes
(1824), who, in addition to refusing to ride in horsedrawn carriages, refused on principle to eat other
animals. In addition, the RSPCA displayed a marked
tendency to oppose cruelty when it was attributable to
the working-class while turning a blind eye to the finer
cruelties of the affluent This double standard was too
much for Mill's sense of social justice; writing to the
secretary on 26 July 1868, he divested himself from
the RSPCA for as long as "it is thought necessary or
advisable to limit the Society's operations to the
offences committed by the uninfluential classes of
society." Evidently the Society never changed, since
Mill never rejoined. As Ryder explains, in what many
will find to be the most interesting, instructive part of
his book, these divisive conflicts among the very people
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who sought to help nonhuman animals were to increase,
both in number and intensity, during the next hundred
years, a point I return to below.
Even while conflicts increased and intensified, Ryder
believes that the cause of animal protection made
progress in Britain during the nineteenth century. It
would be tempting to attribute this to the growing
willingness to accept Darwin's theory of evolution.
Ryder disagrees. Today, it is true, appeals to Darwin
are commonplace. If humans and other animals
resemble one another in morally relevant ways, then it
would be rationally indefensible to treat them in
radically different ways. People appeal to Darwin to
replace the "if' with a "because": Because (as Darwin
has shown) humans and other animals resemble one
another in morally relevant ways, it is rationally
indefensible to treat them in radically different ways.
According to Ryder, the situation was quite different
in Darwin's day. The principle advocates of his theory
back then were his scientific peers, including the growing
army of vivisectors, and although Darwin himself
abhorred vivisection and abandoned a possible career
in medicine because he could not bear to vivisect,
animal protectionists, in a classic case ofconfusing the
message with the messengers, were among the theory's
most vocal critics. Precisely because vivisectors
championed the theory ofevolution, those who opposed
vivisection opposed the theory. Perhaps there is a lesson
to be learned here, and in one sense, of course, there is:
We ought not to confuse the message with the
messenger. That's the easy part. The hard part is to
carry out this wise injunction in practice-as if, for
example, those who oppose vivisection must oppose
all biotechnology, because vivisectors support it.
Why, then, in view of the relative impotence of
Darwin's theory to account for the progress in animal
protection, did the cause of animals make progress in
the nineteenth century? Ryder's explanation seems to
be sociopolitical. That Queen Victoria would lend her
royal name to a cause lent that cause a certain credibility,
to be sure, and the discovery of anaesthetic also played
a role. But far and away the most important changes
concerned, first, the emergence of a growing middle
class, and, second, the blessing of a comparatively long
period of national peace. Ryder writes:
As for the industrial revolution, it increased
atlluence and created a large middle class [and]
liberated some minds to ponder the plight of
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nonhumans... [a] tendency [that] was augmented by the fact that Britain in the nineteenth
century enjoyed an almost unprecedented
period of peace which stretched, interrupted
only by the Crimean and colonial campaigns
(which never, of course, produced any fear of
invasion) from 1815 till the end of the century.
After the 18308 the middle and upper middle
class felt relatively safe; few external threats
distracted them from considering the suffering
of others (p. 165).

"animal movement" during the last hundred years.
There is, frrst, the all too common conflict between
strong personalities, especially when those who clash,
whether for reasons of temperament or philosophy, all
want to lead Second, there are those conflicts that arise
as a result of alternative conceptions of the goals of
animal protection. Is it only some research involving
nonhuman animals that should be stopped, or all of it?
Should we work: to get these animals offpeople's plates,
orjust out of scientists' cages? As we see, the currently
fashionable distinction between advocates of "animal
welfare" and partisans of "animal rights" was fore-shadowed in a previous age, as was the divisiveness
this distinction can help create and sustain.
Moreover, even among those who share the same
goals, and even assuming they are not divided by
reasons of personality, the possibility of irreconcilable
differences cannot be ruled out. For there remains the
question of the means one may prudently or morally
use in pursuit of these goals. Should we accept an
incrementalist, one-step-at-a-time approach to the
abolition of "animal model" research, for example, or
would acceptance of this approach have the paradoxical
consequence of prolonging the very practice one
opposes? And, again, how far may one go in pursuit of
one's goals? May the law be broken? Is violence ever
justified? Lewis Gompertz experienced this kind of
conflict frrst-hand when he was roundly criticized for
using "informers" to help him prosecute those who
broke the law, just as today those abolitionists who
sanction violence and law-breaking must confront the
condemnation of their more Gandhian peers.
What is to be done about such conflicts? How, if at
all, might people who want to help nonhuman animals
begin to look past their differences and embrace their
commonalities? ObViously, there is no easy answer.
Some differences are real, after all. Still, there may be
ways of minimizing them, even when they exist, and it
may be possible for philosophers to find the way. Ryder
presents one such opportunity for his philosopher-peers.
Among the contemporary controversies Ryder.
discusses, one concerns the "What-language-shouldwe-use?" question. Should we say that animals "have
rights," or should we abjure this way of speaking?
Ryder sides with those who would abjure speaking of
"animal rights" because, he says, "it seems to me to be
synthetic and unconvincing-whether applied in the
human case or otherwise" (p. 328). What it means to
say that this way of speaking is "synthetic" is never

For a variety of reasons, then, these "others" in time
came to be seen to include other (nonhuman) animals.
Again, I return to this finding of Ryder's below.
Earlier I mentioned the theme of division and
conflict, as it emerges in the latter part of the nineteenth
century in Britain. If there is some one person more
responsible than any other for this, it may be Frances
Power Cobbe, whom Ryder characterizes as "the most
doughty and effective anti-vivisectionist of the
nineteenth century" (p. 108). Cobbe's life has been
well told by John Vyvyan in his In Pity and in Anger,
frrst published in 1969 and reprinted in 1987 (Micah
Press). Ryder's account lacks some of the verve and
humor of Vyvyan's, but the main outlines bring this
remarkable woman alive.
Dissatisfied with the conservative, incremental,
regulatory approach to vivisection favored by the
RSPCA, Cobbe decided to pursue an abolitionist
agenda. This led her to form, in November, 1875, the
Victoria Street Society, later to be renamed the National
Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS), which Cobbe ably
led for more than two decades, only to find herself and
her allies out-voted in the NAVS elections of 1898,
whereupon she formed the British Union Against
Vivisection (BUAV).
Cobbe did not carry her opposition to vivisection to
the dinner table. Like Gompertz before her, Anna
Kingsford thought a consistent anti-vivisectionism
included vegetarianism, and like her conservative
opponents in the RSPCA, Cobbe did not. And so it
was that these two powerful, visionary and magnetic
women, each committed in her way to the cause of
animal protection, had an association better known for
its antipathy than its warmth.
Kingsford and Cobbe's relationship is a microcosm
of the macrocosmic patterns of conflict that have
characterized not only the British but also the American
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explained, whereas what it means to say that it is
"unconvincing," so far as Ryder is concerned, seems
reasonably clear: Ryder simply is not convinced that
humans or other animals have rights. Very well. But
why, precisely? Merely to be told by Ryder that he
regards this way of speaking as "synthetic" is not
enough. Is there any otherreason? Perhaps. The third
of the following points may be that reason.
It is to be noted, first, that by disavowing the
vocabulary of "rights," Ryder does not see himself as
having to embrace utilitarianism. For Ryder does not
think that we can, nor therefore that we should,
aggregate gains and losses across individuals; that is,
Ryder does not side with utilitarians when they imply
that harming one individual can be justified on the
grounds that other individuals benefit. Here, then, he
honors the spirit, even as he departs from the letter, of
"animal rights."
Second, Ryder distances himself from animal
rightists, and draws nearer to traditional utilitarians,
because he thinks that preventable suffering is the core
concept in ethics; animal rightists, by contrast, are thought
by Ryder to believe that something other than suffering
(for example, being used merely as a means, or as a tool,
or as a resource) is the core concept. Ryder, it seems to
me, does not do justice to the breadth and depth of the
philosophical debate in these quarters (see, especially, pp.
325-329), which makes his embmce of the utilitarian view,
as he understands it, even in the limited way in which he
embraces it, seem possibly impetuous.
But, third, quite apart from any conceptual or moral
questions that might be pressed, there is a way to
understand why an Englishman like Ryder might find
talk of animal or human rights "synthetic." For there is
no tradition of individual rights in British moral and
legal theory or practice, comparable to the one we find
in America. Here (in America, that is) our moral
vocabulary and thought, from the founding of this nation
onward, have been molded around the idea ofindividual
rights; in other places, and in other times, the situation
has been markedly different. Thus may it seem, and
understandably so, that the emphasis on the rights of the
individual could seem "synthetic" to someone from a
tradition in which this idea has played a less central role.
Is there anything that might be learned from this?
Possibly. If there is, I think it is this: We need to learn
to accept the inevitability of the plurality of ways of
thinking and talking morally. For many people, the
locus of ethics is individual responsibility; for others,
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caring; for still others, the general welfare; and for still
others, virtuous character or individual rights.
Philosophically, there may be a correct way of
grounding the moral institution of life. This remains a
live philosophical option. But from a practical point of
view, we may do better to learn to speak in the tongues
of the many, foreswearing any presumption that we
personally are privileged to speak in the language of
the wise few. In other words, we may do well to
recognize which ways of talking are likely to seem
"synthetic" to '" given audience, to explore, both
thoughtfully and fairly, just how far a given way of
thinking and talking might take us when it comes to
animal protection, and to learn, therefore, how extensive
is the common ground which partisans of alternative
views might actually share. Philosophers, in short,
might teach by example when it comes to minimizing
the sense of conflict and division that has characterized
the efforts of people who want to make this world better
for the nonhuman animals with whom we share it.

About the future, Ryder is optimistic. "It may take

thirty or forty years for a movement such as ours to
turn the great ships of commerce and custom, "he writes
(pp. 331-331), but, he implies, tum them we will-in
thirty or forty years. This may prove to be overly
optimistic on Ryder's part even granting him, what is
debatable, his beliefs that compassion and squeamishness are "innate" human capacities. Moreover, Ryder's
optimism about the future does not seem to square with
his explanation about the past. Recall the earlier
discussion of why animal protection efforts gained
momentum in Britain during the nineteenth century;
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the major causes, it seems, were protracted peace and
material prosperity.
Peace we thought was at hand when, to everyone's
relief, the cold war came to an apparent end and (or so
it was thought) we entered a "new world order." And
prosperity? Well, once the need to ann ourselves to the
teeth evaporated, the money left over, the much
ballyhooed "peace dividend," could be used to educate
the young, house the poor, tend the elderly, and generally
to share an abundant material prosperity to more and
more people.
Times change. Even as I write this, the United States
and Iraq remain at war, and the "peace dividend" has
found its way into anning and supporting upwards of
500,000 combat-ready soldiers. So much for the "peace
dividend." And so much for helping others prosper
materially. The plain fact is, the poor are getting poorer,
those who need housing most are getting less, the elderly
are being warehoused in institutions of despair, and so
on. If, then, Ryder is right in believing that peace and
prosperity are needed if animal protection efforts are to
meet with success, the present looks more like the worst
than the best of times for the animals.
This should hardly be surprising. Making the world
better for nonhuman animals is not something that can
be achieved independently of making the world better
for human beings. The slogan, "Animal liberation is
human liberation," is more than a slogan. Genuine
advances in the justice and quality oflife made available
to the one are inseparable from similar advances made
for the other. Things do change in the sense that the
identities of the victims of injustice, whether human or
otherwise, differover time; but so long as injustice rules,
whether the victims are humans or other animals, things
stay the same.
This is why animal advocates who restrict their time
and energy to animal liberation might pause to ask, not
whether our brothers and sisters in fur and feathers and
ems deserve justice (for they do) but whether they have
any realistic chance of obtaining it if we are blind to
the injustice suffered by our brothers and sisters in
human form. This is not to say that we should abandon
the other animals and give all our time and energy to
righting human injustices. This is not to say that at all.
It is only to say that we need to consider the promise
and power of a more complete activism. If there is one
point in Ryder's book about animal advocates of the
past that is of particular relevance to animal advocates
of the present, this is it.
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Response to Regan:
Sentientism
Richard D. Ryder
I am flattered by Tom Regan's very kind and
interesting review of my book Animal Revolution:
Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism, not least because
of his own unparalleled contribution to the cause. I hope
my work is more than just a history of the animal
movement; I have tried to introduce some new psychological, philosophical, and political ideas on the way.
Regan draws attention to my view that Darwinism
did not contribute much to the nineteenth century animal
campaigns. One reason for this was that animal welfare
had already become, by the 1860's, a part of the British
orthodox establishment. Darwin was, in effect, fIrmly
kidnapped by scientific provivisectors like Huxley who
challenged that orthodoxy. In consequence animal
welfarists saw Darwin as their enemy rather than friend.
It was this paradox that struck me as an undergraduate
at Cambridge in the early 1960's. Why was it that the
scientists who happily experimented on animals were
the same people who based their philosophies upon
Darwinian evolution? Experimentation seemed to me to
have become the blood ritual of an alternative and
cannibalistic religion; it preached kinship and yet urged
the ruthless exploitation of kin. This apparent
inconsistency rankled inside me until my indignation
erupted in newspaper letters written in Oxford in 1969 in
which I spelt out what I considered to be the moral
implications of Darwin's message. Ironically, after some
years of campaigning on this Darwinian basis, I now
consider that morality is better based upon sentiency than
upon evolutionary kinship. Hence my promotion ofwhat
I call sentientism-the moral primacy of the individual's
capacity to feel IXlin or distress regardless as to whether
these states are experienced by a human, a rat, an alien,
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